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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of methamphetamine,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a) (West Supp.
2007). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e)
(West 2009). Defendant was also convicted of operating a vehicle without an
ignition interlock system, but he does not challenge that conviction on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Was the evidence sufficient to support Defendant's jury conviction for
possession of methamphetamine?
Standard of Review. "The standard of review for a sufficiency claim is
highly deferential to the jury verdict." State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, ^ 29,122

P.3d 639. The appellate court "begin[s] by reviewing 'the evidence and all
inferences which may be reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to
the verdict/ 7 Id. (citation omitted). The Court "will reverse a jury verdict only if
[it] determine[s] that 'reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict/" Id.
(citation omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES1
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1) (ii) (West Supp. 2010)
"Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership,
control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or
the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption,
as distinguished from distribution, of controlled substances and
includes individual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled
substances. For a person to be a possessor or user of a controlled
substance, ... it is sufficient if it is shown that ... the controlled
substance is found in a place or under circumstances indicating
that the person had the ability and the intent to exercise dominion
and control over it.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2010)
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or
use a controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless
it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a
practitioner while acting in the course of the person's professional
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; ....
1

The State cites to the current versions of the relevant statutory
provisions. Amendments to those provisions subsequent to the date of the
offenses in this case were not substantive.

.?-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by Information with (1) burglary, a second degree
felony; (2) possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony; (3) theft, a
class B misdemeanor; (4) criminal mischief, a class B misdemeanor; (5) violating
a "no alcohol" driver's license restriction, a class B misdemeanor; and
(6) operating a vehicle without an ignition interlock system, a class B
misdemeanor. R.2-1,165-64. A preliminary hearing was held and Defendant
was bound over to district court to stand trial. R.25-24. On Defendant's motion,
the trial court ordered that counts 2 (possession of methamphetamine), 5
(violation of driver's license alcohol restriction), and 6 (operating a vehicle
without an ignition interlock device) "be severed from the remaining counts and
tried jointly." R.199-95. The trial court, however, dismissed count 5 on the
State's motion and Defendant was thereafter tried before a jury on counts 2 and
6. See R.248-47; R.294:113.
At the close of the State's case-in-chief, counsel for Defendant moved for a
directed verdict on the possession of methamphetamine charge for insufficient
evidence, but the motion was denied. See R.294:145-48. Defendant thereafter
testified in his defense and the prosecution recalled the two responding officers
in rebuttal. See R.294:149-63. The jury found Defendant guilty of both counts.
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R.250-49.

On August 11, 2009, the trial court entered judgment against

Defendant, sentencing him to concurrent terms of zero-to-five years for
possession of methamphetamine and 180 days for driving without an ignition
interlock system. R.268-67. On September 14, 2009, Defendant filed a notice of
appeal. R.273-71. Although the notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days
after judgment, the same was timely under the trial court's order granting
Defendant's motion for an extension pursuant to rule 4(e), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. See R.274,270-69.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 20, 2007, Sergeant Edwin Christensen and Officer Kevin
Turner were dispatched to a Saratoga Springs residence on a welfare check.
R.294:66-67,91. On reaching the location, they made contact with Defendant,
who was sitting in a truck parked nearby. R.294: 67-68,70,91. Defendant told
the officers that the truck was a work vehicle and that he had driven it there
from Eagle Mountain. R.294:69-70,92,156. While speaking with Defendant, the
officers smelled "an odor of alcoholic beverage coming from his person."
R.294:68,91. Officer Turner ran a computer check on Defendant and discovered
that his driver's license was subject to an ignition interlock device restriction.
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R.294:69,72,92. Peering into the truck, the officers saw that it did not have the
required device and they thereafter arrested Defendant. R.294:70-73,75,93-95.
In making the arrest, Sergeant Christensen handcuffed Defendant with his
hands behind his back and searched his person incident to arrest. R.294:7475,77,94-95,118,160. He patted down Defendant's outer clothing and checked
his waistband and pockets, but found no weapons or contraband. R.294:7780,117. Sergeant Christensen later acknowledged that he has occasionally failed
to discover contraband in a search incident to arrest that was later uncovered in
a subsequent search. R.294:82,84-85.
After Sergeant Christensen's search of Defendant's person, Officer Turner
placed Defendant in the backseat of his patrol car. R.294:75,95. While sitting in
the driver's seat before leaving, Officer Turner felt the car "kind of moving."
R.294:96,119,126-27,162-63.

He looked back and saw Defendant "leaning

forward and fidgeting around." R.294:96,152. Defendant's movements were so
pronounced that Officer Turner believed he had "bumped his head on the ...
cage that separates the front seats from the back seats." R.294:96. Officer Turner
told Defendant to sit still, but Defendant continued. R.294:127. Suspecting that
Defendant might be trying to remove his handcuffs or hide something, Officer
Turner exited the driver's seat to verify what Defendant was doing. R.294:97.
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When Officer Turner opened the backseat passenger door, he saw
Defendant's handcuffed hands "reached back around" his waist, with his left
hand "in his left front pants pocket," and change spilt onto the cushion and
floor. R.294:97,120,128,157-58. Officer Turner asked Defendant what he was
doing, but Defendant did not answer.

R.294:98,163. Officer Turner then

removed Defendant from the vehicle, collected the spilt change, and searched
the backseat. R.294:98-99. He found a small plastic baggy of methamphetamine
"tucked ... just barely under the backrest" of the seat where Defendant's hands
had originally been. R.294:99,101,120,140-43. When he lifted the baggy up,
Defendant protested that it was not his, that he had already been searched, and
asked to be tested. R.294:122,124-25,154.
Pursuant to department policy, Officer Turner searches the backseat of his
patrol car at the beginning of each shift and after transporting any prisoner to
the jail. R.294:89-90. In doing so, he removes the bottom cushion and also runs
his hand down the crack where the cushion meats the backrest. R.294:90. At the
beginning of his shift on November 20,2010, Officer Turner searched his patrol
car as per policy and found nothing. See R.294:90,98. Defendant was the first
person placed in the backseat of his patrol car that day. R.294:98,102.
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SUMMARY O F A R G U M E N T
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence from a jury verdict, this
Court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict. The Court will not reverse
unless the evidence, so viewed, is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable
that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty. The evidence in this
case was more than sufficient to support the jury's verdict that Defendant
possessed methamphetamine. Officer Turner testified that he found the baggy
of methamphetamine in the very location of Defendant's handcuffed hands
when he was placed in the backseat. He further testified that he had searched
the backseat of his police car at the beginning of the shift and that Defendant
was the first person to be placed there that day. Moreover, after Defendant was
seated in the car, he began moving and fidgeting around. When Officer Turner
opened the backseat door to see what he was doing, Defendant's handcuffed
hands were stretched around his waist, with his left hand in his front pocket.
Finally, Defendant's trial explanation that he was trying to get comfortable was
implausible given the contorted positioning of his hands.
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ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S
VERDICT THAT DEFENDANT UNLAWFULLY POSSESSED
METH AMPHETAMINE
After the State rested its case, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on
the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for
possession of methamphetamine. R.294:145-48. The trial court denied the
motion and the jury thereafter found Defendant guilty. R.250; R.294:148,217-18.
On appeal, Defendant challenges the jury verdict, arguing that "the evidence
introduced at trial was insufficient to establish the necessary nexus between him
and the drugs to justify his conviction [for] possession of methamphetamine/ 7
Aplt. Brf. at 9. Contrary to Defendant's claim, the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury's verdict and this Court should thus affirm.
* **

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence from a jury verdict, this
Court "accord[s] high deference to the fact-finder at trial." State v. Hamilton,
2003 UT 22, | 38, 70 P.3d 111. The Court thus "reviewfs] the evidence and all
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in a light most favorable to the
verdict." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1212 (Utah 1993). It "'dotes] not weigh
conflicting evidence,' nor [does it] 'substitute [its] judgment for that of the fact-
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finder/' 7 Id. at f 38 (citations omitted). If there is conflicting evidence, the Court
"must 'accept that version of events'" which supports the verdict. People v.
Maury, 68 P.3d 1, 30 (Cal. 2003) (citation omitted). This Court "will reverse a
criminal conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that 'reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the crime." State
v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted).
In this case, Defendant was tried for "knowingly and intentionally ...
possess [ing] ... a controlled substance," in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2010). The State was thus required to establish that
Defendant wTas either in "actual physical possession" or in "constructive
possession" of the baggy of methamphetamine found in the backseat of the
police car. See State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318-19 (Utah 1985). Defendant has
assumed, as did the prosecutor below, see R.294:194, that because the officers did
not find the methamphetamine on his person, the State's case rested on a theory
of constructive possession. See Aplt. Brf. at 10.
A person is said to be in "constructive possession" of an object when he or
she does not have actual physical possession of the item, but nevertheless has
"both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over [it]." Fox,
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709 P.2d at 319. Typically, the doctrine of constructive possession is used to
establish possession of drugs found in a location occupied by multiple people.
See, e.g. State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66,122 P.3d 639 (finding live-in girl friend to
be in constructive possession of meth lab in apartment where she and her
boyfriend lived). The doctrine is also used in cases where the defendant is
absent or separated from the place where the drugs are found. See, e.g. Fox, 709
P.2d 316 (finding owner/occupant to be in constructive possession of marijuana
growing at home even though he was no longer there).
Nevertheless, "actual possession and constructive possession ... often so
shade into one another that it is difficult to say where one ends and the other
begins." Natl Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 67 (1914). For example, the
actual theory in this case wras that Defendant had actual physical possession of
the baggy of methamphetamine when he was arrested, but that he discarded it
in the police car in an attempt to avoid drug charges at the jail. See R.294:54-59.
In the end, however, the distinction between actual physical possession and
constructive possession matters little.

To establish either, the State must

demonstrate that "the drugs were subject to the defendant's dominion and
control and the defendant had the intent to exercise that control." State v.
Layman, 1999 UT 79, \ 16, 985 P.2d 911.
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When drugs are found on a defendant's person, the fact of physical
possession is direct evidence of the defendant's "power and intent to exercise
dominion and control over the drug." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. But when the
defendant is not present at the time drugs are found, or when drugs are found
in close proximity to more than one person, the State must rely on other facts to
establish "the necessary nexus" between the defendant and the contraband.
Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, ]f 10,975 P.2d 501. The same is true
when the State is establishing prior actual physical possession.
"Whether a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug exists
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319.
Factors that may be relevant in determining possession "include[e] ownership
a n d / o r occupancy of the residence or vehicle where the drugs were found,
presence of defendant at the time [the] drugs were found, defendant's proximity
to the drugs, previous drug use, incriminating statements or behavior, [and]
presence of drugs in a specific area where the defendant had control." Workman,
2005 UT 66, ^[ 32.

These considerations, however, "are not 'universally

pertinent,'" and the list is not exhaustive. Id. (quoting Layman, 1999 UT 79, f^f
14-15). A review of the record in this case reveals that the jury had ample
evidence to support a finding of possession.
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Officer Turner testified that after removing Defendant from the police car,
he found a baggy of methamphetamine "tucked ... just barely under the
backrest/' in the location "right where [Defendant's] hands were when they
were handcuffed behind his back." R.294:99,101-02. Defendant's proximity to
the drugs just prior to their discovery was the threshold fact in the State's case
establishing a nexus between Defendant and the drugs. See Workman, 2005 UT
66,1f 29 (holding that "presence of drugs in a specific area where the defendant
had control" is an important factor in establishing the necessary nexus).
Because countless others had undoubtedly ridden in the backseat of the
police car, proximity alone was not enough to establish possession. See State v.
Salas, 820 P.2d 1386,1388 (Utah App. 1991) (recognizing that mere presence in
automobile is generally not sufficient alone to establish possession where access
or occupancy is not exclusive).

Accordingly, the State's evidence also

established that Officer Turner searched the backseat of his patrol car at the
beginning of his shift on November 20, 2007: he "r[a]n [his] hand across ... the
crack of the backrest" of the backseat and "tug[ged] up on the bottom cushion,
... pop[ping] it right out," allowing him to "see ... the metal floor of the vehicle
all underneath the cushion." R.294:90. Moreover, he testified that Defendant
was the first person to be placed in the backseat that day. R.294:99,101-02. This

testimony created a strong inference that Defendant, not a prior detainee, had
placed the drugs in the backseat.
The foregoing testimony — establishing that the police car was searched at
the beginning of the shift, that Defendant was the first person to be placed in the
backseat, and that methamphetamine was discovered where he had been sitting
after his removal from the car— was more than sufficient to support the jury's
finding that Defendant possessed the drugs.
Under the State's theory, Sergeant Christensen missed finding the drugs
on Defendant when he searched him incident to arrest, and Sergeant
Christensen admitted at trial that he has on occasion missed finding drugs when
conducting a search incident to arrest. See R.294:82,84-85. In contrast, the
defense theorized that it was Officer Turner who missed finding the drugs when
he searched the car at the beginning of his shift. To accept this version of events,
however, the jury would have been required to not only find that the drugs
were overlooked during Officer Turner's search of the car, but that they were
also overlooked in the search of the car by the officer from the previous shift.
The State, however, produced additional evidence that it was Defendant who
had placed the drugs in the car.
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Officer Turner further testified that while sitting in the front seat, he felt
the car "kind of moving" and turned to see Defendant "leaning forward and
fidgeting around." R.294:96,152. Defendant's movements were so pronounced
that Officer Turner believed Defendant had "bumped his head on the ... cage
that separates the front seats from the back seats." R.294:96. Officer Turner told
Defendant to sit still, but his conduct persisted. R.294:96,127. Suspecting that he
might be trying to remove his handcuffs or hide something, Officer Turner
exited the car, opened the backseat door, and saw Defendant's handcuffed
hands "reached back around" his waist, with his left hand "in his left front pants
pocket," and change spilt onto the cushion and floor. R.294:97,120,128,157-58.
Such "suspicious or incriminating behavior" was yet another fact "linking or
tending to link" Defendant to the methamphetamine, Solas, 820 P.2d at 1388.
Officer Turner additionally testified that when he opened the passenger
door and saw Defendant's handcuffed hands "reached back around" his waist,
Defendant did not answer. See R.294:97-98,120,128,154,157-58,163. But then at
trial, Defendant claimed that he was simply trying to get comfortable because
his wrists hurt. See R.294:152. Given the contorted positioning of Defendant's
handcuffed hands when Officer Turner opened the door, the jury could
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reasonably view Defendant's trial explanation as far-fetched and nothing more
than a post hoc fabrication.
Additionally, although Defendant denied ownership when he saw Officer
Turner hold up the baggy, R.294:122,124-25,154, the jury could reasonably treat
that denial as incriminating because it was an indication of Defendant's
awareness of the character of the drugs. See State v. Gordon, 2007 UT App 66U,
*2 (finding that defendant made incriminating statements where he initially
denied knowing what was in the tin and then later yelling that it was not his
crack cocaine).
In sum, the State introduced evidence that Defendant had secreted the
baggy of methamphetamine in the backseat of the patrol car —the car was
searched at the beginning of the shift, Defendant was moving around after he
was seated in the vehicle, his left hand was in his front pocket, and
methamphetamine was then found where he had been sitting. This evidence
was not "so weak that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, f 18, 210 P.3d 288.
Although Defendant presented a different theory of events, "[t]he jury chose to
believe" the evidence in support of the State's case, and this Court "will not
second guess its judgment." State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, ^ 19,42 P.3d 1248.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction
for possession of methamphetamine.
Respectfully submitted November 19, 2010.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

' S.GRAY

distant Attornev General^
Counsel for Appellee
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